EU Green Paper part 2

The authors of the GP wrote: “…the CFP is regulated through extremely detailed Council regulations that leave very little flexibility in implementing them. This highly unsatisfactory situation…with 'Brussels' seen as deciding on each and every detail…is without doubt the main reason why the CFP is criticised by stakeholders”.

This places them not far from L. O. Cinneide representing Irish fish producers, who called the CFP a total disaster, and from the Icelandic foreign minister Ossur Skarpheoinsson who, while applying for EU membership, said that Iceland wouldn't submit to EU's fisheries management. No wonder. Icelandic fishermen think that the EU's fishery management is no good and that Iceland can teach EU managers more than one lesson. Here GP proposes an option: “… to rely wherever possible on management solutions implemented by Member States, subject to Community standards and control”. Shared fish stocks and shared ecosystems would be managed jointly by the respective states.

Another subject is GP's option of “differentiated management regimes: one for large-scale fleets, where capacity adjustment and economic efficiency are at the core, and another for small-scale fisheries (SSF) in coastal communities with a focus on social objectives”. The idea is to motivate the large-scale segment by “market-based allocation mechanisms” (word-washing for ITQ?) for self-reliance. Coastal SSF would be managed through direct allocation of quotas or effort, or through collective schemes, and its economic viability and its contribution to the life of coastal communities helped by public funding. Decisions concerning small-scale fleets should be taken as close as possible to the coastal community.

This separate approach to SSF is long overdue. For example, fishermen from Hastings (UK) complain that the “unfair quota system set by the EU was killing off their livelihood” by putting the smaller fishing boats out of business. Although, 93% of the boats are under 10m and they employ 83% of the town's fishermen, they are only allowed to catch about 30% of the area's cod quota.

Coming back to ITQ or 'catch shares' (another euphemism for ITQ) a recent Canadian study: A Cautionary Tale about ITQ Fisheries found that British Columbia's quota system is encouraging speculative buying and leasing of quota by 'armchair' fishermen and investors, at the expense of working fishermen, who must pay for expensive lease fees.

According to T. Sutcliffe, of Ecotrust Canada, although “Individual transferable quotas are being heavily promoted, the BC experience is that speculative ITQ markets create as many problems as they solve…and “…fishermen in BC are becoming 'tenants' paying exorbitant rents to landlords, or 'sealords', who own all the quota” (www.ecotrust.ca/fisheries/cautionarytale). This lesson from Canada should be seriously considered by the CFP planners. All the more that reducing overcapacity has led to extreme over-capitalisation, with fishing quotas and licences being worth $1.8 billion or five times the value of all the vessels and equipment in BC's commercial fisheries.

The GP mentions, sort of half heartedly, an option of allocation of quotas to SSF. This is like setting fire to wooden houses. The GP admits that protecting the most fragile coastal communities represents a legitimate social objective. But, marketable quota systems invariably lead to a gradual displacement of the 'weaker' small-scale individual or family-owned fishing enterprises, and to the concentration of fishing rights in the hands of a few, stronger owners, and companies and corporations that might operate SSF by proxy. Experience teaches that legislative attempts at stipulating acquisition of quota by some maximum values hardly help. And in the 'most fragile' fishing communities a demise of small-scale ownership must result in the demise of many of the community facilities, services, and other businesses, and there would be little left for 'protecting'. But, where large and SSF overlap and exploit the same stocks, these are the SSF that need protection, including keeping large-scale fleets off coastal waters.

According to GP 2009, overfishing is both a cause and a consequence of chronic overcapacity and the average fleet reduction by 2% a year is broadly offset by technological progress in fishing efficiency (estimated at 2-3% per year). In short, the old “too many boats chasing too few fish”. The GP submits that transferable fishing rights reduce overcapacity and that this leads to achieve economic efficiency. Sure thing, for the surviving ones. And see the above quoted BC experience.

And there's overcapacity and 'overcapacity'. All depends how it is defined. If EU countries have too large large-scale fleets, they should stop subsidizing them, and reduce overcapacity, indeed. But, it is not necessarily so with SSF. While keeping large fishing vessels idle is costly, reducing large-scale capacity is a rational way for reducing fishing effort. Not so small boats. For example, in SSF effort can be reduced for up to 30% by just having the whole fleet staying at home throughout weekends, say from Friday midnight till Sunday midnight. Easy to enforce, too, and relatively less costly, while fishermen would keep their boats and make living.

There's a tendency within large administrative-bureaucratic systems to have 'common' policies and consequent rules and regulations uniform and wide-ranging. This tendency seems to be now questioned, at least with respect to SSF, as long as they are managed under the common umbrella of CFP elements. However, apart from climatic, geographic, ecological, and other environmental differences, fisheries differ from each other by their vessels, gear, and methods, by the composition, value and size of their catches and marketing system, and above all, by their socio-economic character, culture, technical know-how, and social and political organisation and influence of the fishing people and their communities. Therefore, to be effective, fishery management mechanisms must be tailored to fit the peculiarities of each individual fishery. Undoubtedly, within the EU fisheries system this is a tall order.

I guess you have many more questions and comments. Do send them to: mare-cfp-consultation@ec.europa.eu and don't let EU-fisheries fall back to the cozy routine.