His revolutionary recommendations will hearten workers on deck and bridge. The study, launched last August, gives a panoramic view of excellent, comparative information on fisheries management in seven industrial countries, draws lessons from several others and assesses their applicability to UK fisheries.
Food for thought
Fishery science: all stock assessments and fishing targets (quotas, effort), including advice and recommendations from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) should be reviewed by UK-appointed, peer-review groups. This reinforces successful Faeroese management experiences which contradict ICES.
Co-management: the UK government should control its 200-mile exclusive economic zone and allocate a 30-mile zone to coastal fleets. The six-mile, inshore waters, including all bays and inlets, should be locally managed. All fisheries should be co-managed between fishermen, producer organisations, fishermen's associations and sea fisheries committees, with the involvement of local authorities and environmental groups.
A good model comes from fishery consultant Dr. G. Bernacsek, placineg management responsibility on the fishing sector and (under government-set policy and in consultation with other bodies) transfers resource ownership and management from government to the UK fishing community.
The fishing industry may be required to finance the administration of the sector, but only if it is fully involved in its management and given the flexibility to determine the most cost-effective ways of regulating the fisheries. This includes the authority and opportunity to organise or sub-contract related services.
Quotas: Britain should also consider replacing the quota system with procedures such as that adopted by the Faeroese for days-at-sea effort management. They might also follow Norway's approach of managing straddling stocks with other coastal states. Any steps should preclude aggregation of vessel capacity units and quotas in the hands of a few, mainly large companies. Trade in quotas and licenses should take place only within producer organisations and local areas. If and where quotas are held outside the producer organisations, a representative, national body should be responsible for quota allocation and trade and dis-aggregation of quota holdings should be encouraged.
Discarding grouses
Stock management: policies and rules should not create incentives which foster non-compliance but cooperation over resources and habitat conservation. Discards must be prohibited and all fish in excess of quota would be landed and sold. A levy would ensure that the vessel does not profit, but it would be compensated for the expense of retaining and landing the excess fish.
Fleet capacity: low-impact fishing fleets should be sustained and high-impact fishing fleets gradually reduced. Also, contrary to ICES advice, all industrial fishing for fishmeal and oil factories should be halted. Foreign vessels could only fish within the UK's EEZ within strict conditions, including payment for quotas and with British observers. Mesh-size regulations should be widely applied but with appropriate regional or local variations.
David Thomson's recommendations reflect the frustrations of those working in the British fishery industry, particularly in the Scottish one. This is compounded by a perception that the UK Government is too docile and inadequately defends UK fishing interests when it comes to the EU's common fisheries policy. Many British fishermen claim that the ITQ system promoted by EU opens the door to opportunistic speculators and the acquisition of fishing rights by foreign interests. Few fishermen in the UK buy the argument of genuine, reciprocal trade.
They explain that skippers' illegal behaviour is the result of the reduction of quotas to sub-economic levels and single-species management, a system obliging fishermen to destroy huge quantities of edible and marketable fish and hence a lost resource. To be viable, skippers who cannot buy or lease additional quota must either misreport or land 'black' fish. Management should help otherwise honest fishermen avoid having to cheat on the regulations.
Thomson believes his approach could reduce the suspicion and hostility that have built up between the industry and government. He suggests that Britain assumes full control of its EEZ and deals with the EU as Norway does. That would include making arrangements with Ireland for the Irish Sea and with France for the Channel fisheries. It would have to negotiate separate agreements for British fleets wishing to operate in the waters of other nations. Among additional options mentioned by Thomson, is a management approach based primarily on limited entry and effort control, rather than through total allowable catches and quotas.
In the run-up to the next general election, the UK Conservative party is considering alternatives to quota trade. It suggests the UK government contracts the industry (e.g. groups of local associations) to harvest specific EEZ areas reclaimed from the EU. The industry would pay a value-based levy on all fish landed from such areas.
The contracting associations would parcel out, on the basis of effort rather than quota or TAC, what each fleet or vessel could do, with broader national TACs established as general targets. The quid pro quo would be that the industry would join the government in financing, organising, determining the parameters and the terms of reference as well as overseeing research, administration and safety services for the fisheries sector.
Taking into account the EU's convoluted politics, I somewhat doubt that the UK government will follow Thomson's advice to the letter. Nonetheless, all those in Britain involved in fisheries could do no worse than carefully to read this experienced consultant's study.
